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INTRODUCTION
Courts and legislatures face a fundamental dilemma in construct-
ing the law of patents. Patents convey property rights, and a
substantial degree of certainty is usually thought to be helpful, or
even essential to well functioning property rights.' Yet patents also
cover invention, and human inventiveness by its nature unsettles
1. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty and the Transfer
of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 320 (1984) (concluding that the "wisdom of [the] rules
[governing the transfer of property] turns in large measure on how successfully they enable
present and would-be property claimants to reduce the uncertainties that every assertion of
ownership brings"); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 321, 322 (1985) (arguing that, as "[a] necessary foundation for exchange[,] ... the law
assign all rights in any resource to a closed class of clearly identifiable persons, each of whom
is able (both physically and mentally) to contract at any moment"); Troy A. Paredes, A
Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't
the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-34 (2004) (assuming that "[l]egal certainty"
is "part and parcel of well-defined property rights" and that it "is a valuable asset that
facilitates business and investing"). In the courts, the need for certainty in property has long
been a dominant theme and has been especially apparent in the doctrine of stare decisis. See,
e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting that "[c]onsiderations in favor of
stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved"); see also Hodgson v. Ambrose, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 216, 219 (K.B.)
(stating that "[t]he great object, in questions of property, is certainty'). Though this is the
traditional view, and courts continue to embrace this view, a growing modern literature has
questioned the degree to which certainty is desirable in property rights systems. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 985, 1000-01 (1999) (arguing that uncertainty as to remedy may reduce the deadweight
losses associated with patent rights); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1034-35 (1995)
(showing that, in certain circumstances, "[llegal uncertainty or ambiguity about who owns
property" might have the beneficial effects in encouraging parties "to act more cooperatively");
Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256,
257 (1995) (concluding that, under certain circumstances, "bargaining may be more efficient
under a blurry balancing test than under a certain rule"). Moreover, as another vein of
literature emphasizes, supposedly muddled standards may sometimes provide more certainty
than a hard-edged rule that does not comport with intuition. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 609 (1988) (arguing that "in some instances,
there is a great deal more clarity and certainty about a mud rule than a crystal one" and
providing as an example the "commercial reasonableness" test of the Uniform Commercial
Code). It is also true that, even excluding the uncertainties of patentable subject matter
doctrine, patent rights are well-known to have a high degree of uncertainty both as to the
validity and scope of rights. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005) (detailing the numerous uncertainties associated with
patent rights).
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certainty, changes the status quo, and breaks through preexisting
assumptions.
In legal doctrine, the conflict between certainty and creativity
plays out within the familiar jurisprudential debate between rules
and standards. 2 Clear rules can provide the certainty that encour-
ages investment both in obtaining and developing the rights, but
standards can provide the flexibility to accommodate the new and
unpredictable wonders of human ingenuity. The stakes of this
traditional debate are highest for the doctrine of patentable subject
matter, which governs the fundamental boundaries of the patent
law's domain.
The latest controversy in the field of patentable subject matter
provides a perfect example. In the en banc decision In re Bilski,3
rendered in the fall of 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit overruled its prior doctrinal test and established
a new rule-not a flexible standard-for determining whether a
process is patentable subject matter: "[A] claimed process is surely
patent-eligible under § 101," the Bilski majority confidently an-
nounced, "if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing."4
The Federal Circuit identified that its overarching goal was to
"clarify the standards applicable in determining whether a claimed
method constitutes a statutory 'process' under § 101."' Because clar-
ification was the goal, it is unsurprising that the Federal Circuit
attempted to articulate a definite rule to govern this area of law,
and the court plainly understood that it was choosing to attempt a
more rule-based approach in this area of law. The court repeatedly
referred to its new doctrine as "the machine-or-transformation test,"6
2. The literature has investigated and debated the merits and demerits of rules and
standards. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STuD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
3. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.
Ct. 2735 (2009).
4. Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 949.
6. See, e.g., id. at 961, 963-64, 966 (emphasis added).
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emphasized that its new test "is the only applicable test and
must be applied... when evaluating the patent-eligibility of process
claims,"7 and warned that "[n]either the PTO nor the courts may
pay short shrift to the machine-or-transformation test by using
purported equivalents or shortcuts such as a 'technological arts'
requirement."8 Nothing in the en banc opinion suggested that the
court envisioned that future three-judge panels or Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examiners would have to weigh and bal-
ance a variety of competing policy considerations to apply the court's
new machine-or-transformation test.
In announcing its new test, the Bilski court expressly disavowed
the analysis that had been set forth in its 1994 en banc decision
In re Alappat,9 and had been applied in its 1998 and 1999 panel
decisions, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group ° and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc." That line
of cases had, in turn, disavowed an even earlier test, known as the
Freeman- Walter-Abele test, which derived from three cases decided
between 1978 and 1982.12 Thus, the Federal Circuit and its pre-
decessor court have changed the rules governing patentable subject
matter no less than three times in thirty years.
While it is true that the en banc Bilski court was vigorously
pursuing the goal of clarifying the law of patentable subject matter,
that objective does not distinguish the present from the past. In the
now disavowed AT&T decision, for example, the Federal Circuit
had reassured the practicing bar that the "concern, that the rules
[of patentable subject matter] are not sufficiently clear to enable
7. See id. at 964.
8. See id.
9. 33 F.3d 1526, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
10. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
11. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For the Bilski court's express disavowal of the analysis
in this line of cases, see Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 & n.19 (stating that the analysis in the
Alappat-State Street-AT&T line of cases was "inadequate" and "should no longer be relied
on").
12. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978), modifying In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.PA. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The
progression toward disavowing the Freeman- Walter-Abele test is detailed in AT&T Corp.,
when the court reviewed the prior history of the test, noted that State Street had questioned
its continuing vitality, and concluded that "[w]hatever may be left of the earlier test, if
anything, this type of physical limitations analysis [from the Freeman- Walter-Abele test]
seems of little value." AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1359.
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reasonable prediction of outcomes, should be less of a concern today
[1999] in light of the refocusing of the § 101 issue that Alappat and
State Street have provided."' 3 Not only did that reassurance fail to
remain valid for the statutory life of a patent (approximately twenty
years); it failed to remain good even for the time of prosecuting some
patent applications. The very application at issue in Bilski had been
already pending for two years when the AT&Tcourt was touting the
clarity that Alappat and State Street had brought to the law of
patentable subject matter.
Since the announcement of the en banc court's opinion, it has
become evident that the Federal Circuit will not have the final word
as to whether the machine-or-transformation test will be embraced
as a means for clarifying the law of patentable subject matter.
On June 1, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Bilski case.' 4 This development dramatically increases the impor-
tance of the case. In light of the Federal Circuit's past failures to
bring clarity to this area, the practicing patent bar-and more
importantly their clients, the inventors of our society-might
reasonably wonder whether the Supreme Court will also endorse
the machine-or-transformation test or some other new rule in an
attempt to bring clarity to the area. More importantly, the inventors
and their attorneys will want to know (and indeed, to make
investments, they may need to know) how durable any new test
promulgated by the Supreme Court is likely to be.
That question is vitally important because subject matter doctrine
governs the fundamental scope of the patent system. Changes to
the doctrine have the potential to exclude from the system whole
fields of endeavor, such as financial innovations, data processing
methods, operations engineering, and diagnostic techniques. By
contrast, changes to other patent doctrines such as obviousness law,
enablement requirements, or the doctrine of equivalents might
change the fate of some claims to invention or infringement. But at
least in most instances, those claims would have been recognized as
having marginal quality even under a somewhat different set of
doctrinal rules.
13. AT&T, 172 F.2d at 1361.
14. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009).
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Moreover, clarity without durability has limited value for a
system in which long term investment in tomorrow's innovations is
supposed to be fostered through property rights lasting for two
decades.15 For such a system, a clear but transient rule may be
inferior to a standard that is less clear and less predictable in
application, but more durable.
Evaluating the longer historical record, this Article makes two
points about rules and standards in this field. First, for patentable
subject matter, there is a clear winner in the long run. Eventually,
rules always fail. This should surprise no one who studies inno-
vation. The unruly process of creative destruction has the power to
undermine today's legal rules every bit as much as it renders
obsolete today's industrial products, processes, and institutions.
Moreover, the long term failure of rules in defining patentability
is also consistent with general models that predict standards to
be more durable than rules when conditions are changing, and
innovation presents a quintessential circumstance of change.16
Thus, patent lawyers and inventors need to take into account that
any apparent clarity provided by a newly promulgated rule of
patentable subject matter may not survive any longer than the rules
provided by Alappat, State Street, AT&T, and their predecessors.
A second point, which should also be familiar to students of inno-
vation policy, provides some consolation to the proponents of rules.
Just as in innovation generally, failures have value. The short term
certainty associated with rules may provide necessary, if temporary,
safe harbors that allow property rights to thrive. And even in the
long run, the repeated failures of patentable subject matter rules
15. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (establishing twenty year term for patents).
16. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 2, at 277 (noting that "[a]n important cost of
legal regulation by means of rules is thus the cost of altering rules to keep pace with economic
and technological change" and that "[o] bsolescence is not so serious a problem with regulation
by standard"). The vulnerability of rules to obsolescence is also consistent with the view that
rules fare better when they are applied to relatively homogeneous circumstances, for temporal
change is merely one circumstance that can destroy homogeneity. See id. at 272 (predicting
greater use of rules "where the relevant primary behavior is homogeneous"); Kaplow, supra
note 2, at 563 (predicting that rules are more likely to be developed when they will be applied
"frequently in settings with common characteristics"); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 993 (noting
that "[riules are often shown to be perverse through new developments that make them
anachronistic").
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provide crucial insights into the meaning and process of invention
in our society.
This history of failures should not necessarily dissuade courts
from ever attempting to create relatively clear rules of patentable
subject matter, but the history provides some practical lessons into
how courts should go about making and interpreting rules when
they do decide to create them. Though knowing their rules will
ultimately fail, courts might reasonably decide to fashion rules if the
rules have a good chance at meaningful durability, but "durability"
in the context of a patentable subject matter rule must, at the very
least, exceed the statutory lifetime of a patent. A rule of patent-
ability expected to endure for ten or fifteen years should not be
considered a success. For such a short-lived rule, rational inventors
would appropriately discount the apparent certainty of today's rule
and attempt, to the extent possible, to average today's rule with the
possible permutations of rules that might follow in future years. Of
course, inventors may have very limited ability to forecast the
precise contours of future new rules, but their limited ability to
forecast the future simply makes the apparent certainty of today's
rule all the more useless.
The need for durability in patentability rules also has a corollary:
during its lifetime, the rule must be such that judges of differing
policy perspectives can agree to the rule and be willing to tolerate
its inevitably formalistic boundaries. Such a rule does not need to
approximate the policy preferences of the "median judge," with an
approximate balance between those judges who view the rule as
excessively generous and those who view it as excessively restric-
tive. Indeed, attempts to craft such a "balanced" rule are likely to be
counterproductive because such balances can shift fairly quickly
as judicial personnel change. Rather, the rule needs to have some
basis of certainty that is likely to command enough respect that a
majority of future judges will be willing, without regard to their
policy views about the rule's over- or under-inclusiveness, to resist
the temptation to recalibrate the rule repeatedly. If that sort of
durability and stability cannot be achieved, a court should not strive
to clarify the law with a crisp rule because any apparent clarity will
be only a temporary illusion.
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I. CHALLENGES IN DEFINING THE LIMITS OF PATENTABILITY
The law of patentable subject matter has long been seen as an
extremely difficult area of law. Thus, for example, Willard Phillips,
one of the great early treatise writers of American patent law,
introduced the section of his treatise on "what kinds of new
inventions are patentable" with the warning that it was "a very
difficult branch of the law patents."17 So too, the most influential
British commentator of the mid-nineteenth century, Thomas
Webster, warned readers of the "difficulty" attendant with any
attempt "to classify all the subject-matters of letters patent."'8
Similarly, George Curtis thought that "[1]anguage may be inade-
quate to express all the minute distinctions which present them-
selves, in considering what may, consistently with the purposes and
objects of the Patent Law, be the subject of a patent."'9
That long recognized difficulty surely provides one reason that
rules have not proven enduring in the area. But why has the field
been considered so difficult? Before turning to the legacy of failed
rules, we should consider possible answers to that question.
At least three overarching reasons explain why patentable sub-
ject matter has long been considered one of the most challenging
doctrinal areas of patent law. First, as previously mentioned,
changing conditions present well-known difficulties for rules, and
the law of patentable subject matter inevitably operates on the ever-
changing forefront of human knowledge and creativity. Settled
expectations on these frontiers are not possible; forecasting and
prognostication are perilous. The problem is especially hard for legal
actors who are invariably trained to use precedent as a guide, for
the very goal of the patent system is to foster departures from the
past in new and unexpected ways. Patent law is designed to bring
about the obsolescence of today's technology; it should be no surprise
that the form of lawmaking most susceptible to obsolescence--
17. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTION 73 (1837).
18. THOMAS WEBSTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 8-9
(1841).
19. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE; ON THE LAW OF PATENTS § 69 (2d ed. 1873).
616 [Vol. 51:609
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rules-would experience significant problems in defining the law
of patentability.
The challenge of the field is perhaps best summarized by Thomas
Webster, who perceptively noted over a century and a half ago that
the difficulty in attempting "to classify all subject-matters of letters
patent ... arises in great measure from the fact of the arts and
manufactures of a country being in a continual state of progression,
whereby objects of skill never before contemplated suddenly present
themselves."2 ° For that reason, Webster preferred the simplicity of
the English Statute of Monopolies, which extended patentability to
"any manner of new manufactures within this realm" and thus had
"comprehensive import" in "point[ing] out distinctly the class of
inventions which it is the intention and policy of the legislature to
protect."'"
The intractability of the ultimate policy issues provides a second
cause for the failure of rules in this area. Though the case law of
patentable subject matter sometimes frames the issue in semantic
terms-for example, as a decision about whether a particular
human achievement properly can be considered to be a patentable
"invention," not an unpatentable "discover[y of] a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature"22-the more careful judicial opinions recog-
nize that any act, judicial or legislative, creating rules of patentable
subject matter should be based on a policy judgment about the
efficacy and desirability of patents in the area covered by the
proposed rule. Justice Breyer, for example, candidly recognized in
his dissenting opinion in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (LabCorp),23 that the justification for
prohibiting patents on natural laws "does not lie in any claim that
'laws of nature' are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that
they are not useful.' 24 "Rather," Justice Breyer noted, "the reason
for the exclusion [from patentable subject matter] is that sometimes
too much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the
20. WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 8-9.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,130 (1948).
23. 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
24. Id. at 126 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of
patent and copyright protection."25
Justice Breyer's LabCorp opinion reveals a key reason for the
instability of rules in the area, for the patentable subject matter
doctrines are based not on a moral or ethical decision about the
desirability of patents as an end in themselves, but on empirical
estimation of the usefulness of patents in achieving other ends
(progress). It is quite sensible that any exclusion to patentable
subject matter should "reflect[] a basic judgment that protection in
such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too
often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the
further spread of useful knowledge itself."2 Unfortunately, no good
data exist to make those empirical estimations, or at least no good
data exist to make those empirical estimations in a way that could
tailor distinct rules about patentability. Indeed, the ultimate policy
judgment-the extent to which the potentially positive effects of
patents are outweighed by their potential negative effects-has long
been recognized as unknown given the current state of human
knowledge.
As Fritz Machlup famously summarized society's inconclusive
knowledge about the effects of the patent system:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences,
to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of
our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.27
Machlup made that statement in 1958, which was six years after
Congress last amended the statutory sections on patentable subject
matter.28 Rigorous empirical knowledge was obviously more prim-
itive in early times and might well be considered nonexistent in
1793, when the basic format of current § 101 was written into stat-
25. Id. at 126-27 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c]. 8).
26. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
27. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN
ECONOMIc REvIEw OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (Patent Study of Fritz
Malchup).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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utory law as part of the second United States Patent Act. Thus, if
courts look to statutory law, they will not find a satisfying answer
to the empirical question that, as Justice Breyer notes, would be the
best basis for the law.
Although the statutory law cannot hold the answer to the
empirical question posed by Justice Breyer, case law is also an un-
promising source of guidance. For example, Breyer's recent dissent
in LabCorp cites Neilson v. Harford,29 Le Roy v. Tatham,"° O'Reilly
v. Morse,31 The Telephone Cases,32 and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.33 Only the last of those was even decided in the
twentieth century, and all of them were decided prior to Machlup's
dismal assessment that mankind possesses hardly any rigorous
empirical knowledge about the costs and benefits of the patent
system. Furthermore, principles of stare decisis require that those
earlier cases should provide the foundation for later cases such as
Gottschalk v. Benson,34 Parker v. Flook,3" Diamond v. Chakrabarty,36
and Diamond v. Diehr.37 Thus, even if knowledge about the effects
of the patent system were to have advanced in the half century since
Fritz Machlup, the case law might still reflect the past.
The biggest impediment to developing stable patentable subject
matter doctrine is not, however, the constraint of stare decisis;
rather, it is the continuing inability to answer the question identi-
fied by Justice Breyer with any rigorous and convincing data. The
social costs and benefits of the patent system as a whole remain the
subject of fierce debate.38 Given that overarching uncertainty-as to
whether to have any patent system at all-it is hardly surprising
that courts, legislatures, and other policymaking institutions have
trouble answering the marginal question of where the periphery of
29. (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Exch.).
30. 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
31. 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
32. 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
33. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
34. 409 U.S. 63 (1972); see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing these cases).
35. 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
36. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
37. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
38. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 144-46 (2008)
(collecting empirical data on the private costs and benefits of the patent system and
purporting to demonstrate that the system "place[s] a drag on innovation).
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the system should be. Policymakers are thus left to fashion law with
intuition, perhaps coupled with a willingness to tolerate some
degree of experimentation.
A third reason for the doctrinal difficulties in this area is
applicable specifically to the law fashioned by United States courts.
For more than two centuries, United States statutory law has
defined patentable subject matter in extremely broad terms. The
current version of § 101, which was enacted in 1952, states quite
simply that anyone who "invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
fore."39 Section 101 is also supplemented by § 100(b), which defines
the statutory word process as "mean[ing] process, art, or method,
and includ[ing] a new use of a known process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter, or material."4 That broad and seem-
ingly unqualified statutory language had only two statutory
predecessors-enacted in 1790 and 1793-both of which were also
remarkable for their breadth.4 Thus, the statutory language has
consistently pointed toward an expansive approach to patentable
subject matter, but the courts have vacillated between quite
different approaches to interpreting the statute.
When they have viewed the issue as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the courts have generally sustained broad patent
eligibility. Thus, in the past three patentable subject matter cases
it has decided, the Supreme Court has been guided by textualist
instincts. In its 1980 Chakrabarty opinion, the Court reasoned that
"[iln choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'composi-
tion of matter' [in § 101], modified by the comprehensive 'any,'
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope."" The following year, the Court repeated in Diamond v.
Diehr its long-standing admonition that "courts 'should not read into
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has
39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
41. The first U.S. Patent Act in 1790 defined as patentable subject matter "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein." Act of Apr. 10, 1790,
1 Stat. 109, 110. In 1793, Congress modified the definition of patentable subject matter to be
"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement [thereofl." Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318, 319.
42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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not expressed."'43 Finally, in J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred International, Inc., the Court described the language of
§ 101 as "extremely broad."" Not surprisingly, the Court sustained
the patentability of the claimed inventions in each of those cases.45
These textualist decisions avoid the intractable empirical questions
of whether, on average, patents in particular classes advance or
retard progress, for the judges adhering to a textualist approach can
lay responsibility at Congress's doorstep.
Contrasting with this textualist approach to the issue, an en-
tirely different methodology for deciding patentable subject matter
questions has treated the area as one of federal common law. That
approach starts with the judicially recognized exceptions to pat-
entability and tailors the scope of those exceptions either through
case law reasoning, or, as Justice Breyer aspired to do in his
LabCorp dissent, with estimations of the answers to ultimate policy
questions such as whether the costs of patent protection outweigh
the benefits in any particular area.4"
It is an understatement to say that there is an obvious and
significant tension between the statutory and common law ap-
proaches to the patentable subject matter issue. Thus, while the
statutory method forbids courts from "read[ing] into the patent
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed,"47 the cases decided under the common law approach
"foreclose[] a purely literal reading of § 101" and make inventions
unpatentable even though they fall within "the ordinary sense of
the word[s]" of § 101." When it has felt unencumbered by a literal
reading of the statute and the ordinary sense of the statute's
words, the Court has in fact been reading into the statute a set of
unexpressed conditions and limitations, and those rules, however
transitory they may be, have defined the restrictions imposed on the
statute's text.
43. 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308).
44. 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).
45. Id. at 145-46; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 347-48.
46. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138-39 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. United States v. Dubliner Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933).
48. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
49. Id. at 588.
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None of this is to judge whether a statutory or common law
approach is more meritorious to the area of patentable subject
matter. Rather, the point here is merely that the Court has not
consistently adhered to one or the other methodology. The changes
in approach perhaps have tracked jurisdictional battles between the
Justices. Vacillation between the two approaches has occurred and
is at least partly responsible for the instability in the area.
In addition to these general factors making patentable subject
matter a difficult area (and an especially difficult area for artic-
ulating stable rules), two other factors have tended to operate
against patentable subject matter rules in particular contexts. First,
the promulgation of rules is generally assumed to require greater
amounts of information than does the articulation of standards5 0 If
so, institutions having greater access to information are likely to be
more inclined to create rules than are institutions with lesser
access." Since repeated experience with a subject is one way to gain
information, institutions with greater day-to-day experience with
deciding patentability issues should be more willing to attempt to
formulate rules. Thus, within the patent system, the PTO should be
most inclined to create rules governing patentability, and the
Supreme Court should be the least inclined.
Second, an important asymmetry exists in the costs of a rule
restricting patentable subject matter as compared to the costs of a
rule expanding patentable subject matter. If an empirical ap-
proach similar to Justice Breyer's in LabCorp is embraced as the
touchstone by which to judge rules of patentable subject matter, the
costs associated with rules authorizing a broad approach to
patentable subject matter-the costs arising from the possibility
that the patent "would too often severely interfere with, or dis-
courage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge
itself"52-- can be mitigated by other patent law doctrines that limit
the availability and scope of patents.
50. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 2, at 585 ('Chen the government promulgates a rule, it
gathers information before individuals act and announces its findings.").
51. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1003 (predicting that rules will likely be avoided "when the
lawmaker lacks information and expertise, so that the information costs are too high to
produce rules").
52. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127-28 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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For example, the statutory obviousness doctrine provides courts
with a means to restrict the patent system to "those inventions
which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of
a patent." 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reemphasized that
the nonobviousness requirement is designed to eliminate patents
that "might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful
arts."54 Thus, given the nonobviousness doctrine as articulated in
Graham and KSR, it should be a rare situation in which an entire
class of patents complies with the nonobviousness requirement
and yet still somehow discourages or impedes the development and
spread of useful knowledge. Moreover, if such a class of patents can
be identified, there are alternatives to restricting patentable subject
matter rules, including imposing a more demanding nonobviousness
requirement or restricting patent scope through the enablement
doctrine or via restrictive claim interpretation. By contrast, patent
law itself has no way to remedy the costs of a rule restricting
patentable subject matter, which include the loss of the "potentially
positive incentive effects" associated with granting patents that
comply with the nonobviousness requirement and other patent
doctrines. As a result, we should expect to observe fewer, and
perhaps less durable, rules excluding inventions from patentable
subject matter.
The confluence of these factors has produced a clear effect: the
law defining limits of patentability has generally been hostile to
rule-based approaches, and that hostility has been especially
apparent for rules of exclusion at the Supreme Court.
II. THE HISTORY OF FAILED PATENTABILITY RULES
It is tempting to think that the recent instability in the law of
patentable subject matter-three different approaches articulated
by the Court of Appeals in three decades, with each new one
disavowing its predecessor-bespeaks a rather extraordinary time
in the history of patentable subject matter. But it is not so. Below is
at least a partial list detailing the march of failures in the area.
53. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
54. KSR Intl Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
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A. The Unpatentability of Changes in Form and Proportions
While most of the rules for finding patentable subject matter have
been judicially created, we begin with an example of a legislative
rule that was also short-lived. Enacted in 1793, the second patent
act in the United States included not only the general statutory
formulation of patentable subject matter, but also a very specific
rule stating that "simply changing the form or the proportions of
any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be
deemed a discovery."55 Though today we may correctly view that
rule as having a distant kinship to modern obviousness doctrine, at
the time, the rule was properly characterized as a restriction on
patentable subject matter.56
How did this early rule fare? Not so well. Almost as soon as courts
began to apply it, they began to modify it. 5" As Chief Justice
Marshall summarized the doctrine in 1822:
It is not every change of form and proportion which is declared
to be no discovery, but that which is simply a change of form or
proportion, and nothing more. If, by changing the form and
proportion, a new effect is produced, there is not simply a change
of form and proportion, but a change of principle also.58
As this passage indicates, the statutory "form and proportions" rule
quickly morphed into a more flexible, judicially-created doctrine
under which patentability turned less on whether there had been a
change in form and proportions and more on whether the innova-
tor's work had brought forth a "change of principle." The statutory
55. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321. The "form or proportions"
language was nearly a verbatim translation of an identical provision in the 1791 French
Patent Law. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 36 (2007).
56. The 1793 Act's statutory prohibition on patenting changes in "form or proportions"
was drafted as a basic limitation on what could be considered a patentable "discovery." Patent
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2. Commentators of the time included this provision within
general discussions of patentable subject matter. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 17, at 126-35
(discussing the "changes in form" doctrine in the chapter on "The Subjects of Patents" and
grouping the doctrine at the end of a list of doctrines defining what types of innovations could
be patentable).
57. See Duffy, supra note 55, at 37.
58. Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 159 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1827) (No. 3,645) (Marshall, C.J.,
sitting as Circuit Justice).
624 [Vol. 51:609
PATENTABILITY RULES
"form or proportions" restriction was repealed in 1836,"9 and though
treatises continued to mention the rule throughout the nineteenth
century, its importance continued to wane until it was utterly
forgotten.' The more flexible "change of principle" concept became
dominant, though that too eventually evolved into the modern
concept of obviousness.61
Thus, the history of the doctrine governing "changes in form or
proportions" can be seen as a very clear example in which a more
flexible standard triumphed in the long run over a per se rule. The
original legislatively created rule was based on a valid policy
concern-that patents should not be granted for minor and insig-
nificant changes. The legislature did not, however, choose merely to
announce a general standard prohibiting patents on trivial or easily
made inventions. The legislature tried to craft a rule. As is always
the case, the rule had some degree of over- and under-inclusiveness.
Yet the sharp edges of the rule did not survive long. The court
immediately interpreted it in a way that blurred the sharp lines
that the legislature had tried to draw, and the legislature itself
abandoned the rule within a half century. What was left of the
rule-or rather what took the place of the rule-was the "invention"
or "nonobviousness" standard, which has now survived more than
a century and a half and has come to be adopted throughout the
world.
B. The Unpatentability of Plants and Animals
Ever since the Supreme Court's Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision
in 1980, it is tempting to think that plants, animals, and other
living creations are clearly patentable if the living matter "is the
result of human ingenuity and research" rather than a "product of
nature[ ."62 While that is the law after Chakrabarty, it is fairly clear
that the rule of practice had previously been the opposite.
59. Compare Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (providing that "simply changing the form or the
proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a
discovery"), with Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 119 (failing to include the "form or
proportions" language).
60. See Duffy, supra note 55, at 37-38.
61. See id. at 37-41 (tracing that development).
62. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
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As mentioned in Chakrabarty itself, the Secretary of Agriculture
opined to Congress in 1930, when Congress was considering the
enactment of the Plant Patent Act, that "the patent laws ... at the
present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries
in the field of inanimate nature. 63 The Supreme Court majority
dismissed this assessment by noting that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture lacked "competence" in patent law and by claiming that "there
[was] language in the House and Senate Committee Reports
suggesting that to the extent Congress considered the matter it
found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive."64
There are huge problems with the Supreme Court's history here.
First, the language in the congressional Committee Reports cited
by the Court merely noted that"'[t]here [was] a clear and logical
distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of
certain inanimate things."'65 As noted by the Court, the Committee
Reports explained that a newly discovered inanimate object, such as
a new mineral, "'is created wholly by nature unassisted by man,"'
while a newly discovered plant '"resulting from cultivation is
unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be
reproduced by nature unaided by man.""'6 Yet if anything, the
language from the Committee Reports supports the Secretary of
Agriculture's view. For despite the '"clear and logical distinction"'
noted in the Committee Reports-and despite the necessity of
human intervention to bring forth and maintain the new cultivated
plant-the Reports still make clear that such plants were not within
the patent system as it then existed.6"
Second, the Secretary of Agriculture, while not in charge of the
patent system, was supposed to be an expert on matters of farming,
agriculture, and the plants and animals used in those pursuits.6" If
he did not have expertise in patent law, it was only because patent
63. Id. at 312 (quoting S. REP. No. 71-315 app. A (1930) and H.R. REP. No. 71-1129 app.
A (1930)).
64. Id. at 313.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Act of May 13, 1862, ch. 2, § 1, 12 Stat. 387 (establishing the Department of
Agriculture, to be headed by a Commissioner of Agriculture to "diffuse among the people ...
useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and
comprehensive sense of the word").
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law had never been construed to permit the patenting of the plant
and animal breeds that were important to agriculture. Moreover,
when proposals had been made to cover living things with a patent-
type system of regulation, the Department of Agriculture was con-
sidered one of the most logical government agencies to lead the
change.69 Indeed, when Congress later enacted the Plant Variety
Protection Act in 1970 (which creates exclusive rights for new
varieties of plants even if not asexually reproduced), Congress
lodged supervisory power over the new Act in the Department of
Agriculture.7 °
Third, despite many successful efforts to develop new plant types
for agricultural purposes prior to the enactment of the Plant Patent
Act, "no instance of anyone attempting to patent a plant under
that statute-successfully or unsuccessfully-seems to have been
reported," and "none of the patent law commentators of the day took
issue with the generally accepted premise that plants were cate-
gorically ineligible for patent protection.",7' That unbroken and
unchallenged practice explains why the enactment of the Plant
Patent Act in 1930 was widely viewed as "radically enlarg[ing] the
field of patentable inventions. 72 Similarly, Thomas Edison praised
the new law as "giv[ing] the plant breeder the same status as the
mechanical and chemical inventors now have through the patent
law. 75 Both of these quotations suggest that the new Plant Patent
Act was significant, not because Congress was merely relaxing the
written description requirement as applied to plants (which was the
Chakrabarty Court's view of what the Plant Patent Act had done),
but because Congress was extending the patent system to a wholly
new area.
Fourth, both before and after the enactment of the Plant Patent
Act, commentators had interpreted the general patent system as
69. See Harold C. Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF.
SOCY 23, 27 (1923) (suggesting that "[t]he Department of Agriculture might be able to have
laws enacted on behalf of the plant propagators for compensating them for their valuable
discoveries and services in a similar manner").
70. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2372 (2006) (establishing the Plant Variety Protection Office in
the Department of Agriculture and conferring on the Secretary of Agriculture supervisory
powers over the office).
71. John W. Behringer, Microorganism Patents, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 128, 130-31 (1981).
72. Joseph Rossman, Plant Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 7, 8 (1931).
73. Id. (quoting Edison).
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inapplicable to living things. Thus, for example, one commentator
writing in 1923 opined that "plants and animal organisms, even
though very valuable uses may be discovered for them, or they may
have been obtained by the aid of scientific management in their
propagation, grow as natural products, and as such they are not
discoveries which are subject to patentable protection."74 The basic
belief thus seemed to be that breeds of plants and animals should
be considered "natural" and therefore unpatentable even when the
new plant was obtained by human intervention.
Similarly, writing in 1937, seven years after the Plant Patent Act,
P. J. Federico opined that one of Louis Pasteur's claims--directed to
'"[y]east, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufac-
ture"'-was "unique in patents in respect of its subject matter."75 At
the time of Federico's article, it was well known that patents could
claim purified natural products (that is, products "free from" various
other substances). 76 The "unique"-ness of Pasteur's claim must have
been that it was claiming a living organism-yeast. Such a claim,
Federico wrote, "would now probably be refused by the examiner,
since it may be doubted that the subject-matter is capable of being
patented."77
In 1953, another commentator-one who sought to have a patent-
like system extended to all plants (legislatively)-nonetheless recog-
nized:
The protection of biological specimens and products does not fall
within the pattern of thinking of those who have regarded the
question of patentable classes of inventions and discoveries as
confined entirely to things capable of being manufactured. Even
the plants covered by the U.S. Patent Plant Act partake of the
nature of manufacture, since excluded by the Act are tubers and
plants which are sexually reproduced. 8
74. Thorne, supra note 69, at 25. Thorne considered, but rejected, any extension of the
patents to living matter, arguing that to have a patent "system in which plant and animal life
is involved would be the granting of patents for the use of natural powers and would
undoubtedly be of little or no help in promoting progress along those lines." Id. at 28.
75. P. J. Federico, Commentaria, Louis Pastuer's Patent, 19 J. PAT. OFF. SocY. 966, 967
(1937).
76. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 99, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L.
Hand, J.), affd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
77. Federico, supra note 75, at 967.
78. John A. Dienner, Patents for Biological Specimens and Products, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
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In sum, the unpatentability of plants and animals had a solid
historical foundation; it was not a position that the PTO newly
minted in the 1970s to deny Dr. Chakrabarty a patent.
Still, the Supreme Court's rejection of the old rule was justified.
The rule against patenting living material had three significant
weaknesses that were becoming all the more glaring as it was being
carried forward into more modern times. First, although the pro-
hibition against living matter had been viewed as a mere corollary
to the larger principle forbidding patents on natural processes and
products, that view was becoming increasingly difficult to sustain
as technology marched forward. In earlier times, new types of living
organisms had been developed with some assistance of human ac-
tivity, but the new organisms had come from selective breeding,
which relies heavily on natural chance and mutation.9 In a real
sense, nature produced the new organisms, humans merely selected
the organisms with desirable qualities.
Because nature could be plausibly seen as the primary generator
of these new types of living organisms, it was relatively easy to view
them as unpatentable. Even some of the broadest words in the
statutory definition of patentable subject matter carry definitions
that tend to exclude natural phenomena. For example, the word
"art," which also appears in the constitutional clause that provides
the basic foundation for the federal patent system, was understood
at the time when it was written into both statutory and consti-
tutional patent law to refer to the "power of doing something not
taught by nature and instinct."8 ° The structure and purpose of the
286, 289-90 (1953). Dienner was simultaneously arguing for the enactment of a new system
of patent-like protection that would cover all plants and animals, for he saw the limitations
of patentable subject matter as retarding the progress of agriculture in comparison to the
progress of industry:
The engineers go into manufacturing industry; and industry, being protected by
the Patent System, flourishes mightly. Agriculture, on the other hand, being
unprotected by any such system as the Patent System, and no incentive on the
part of the individual farmer or agricultural worker to produce new varieties of
plants and animals, has had to depend upon State subsidy of recent times,
having suffered severe blows of deflation in prior times.
Id. at 289.
79. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (describing the claimed
discovery in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948), as "only
some of the handiwork of nature").
80. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 182 (6th ed. 1785),
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Patent Act also strongly point toward an interpretation that ex-
cludes natural processes and the products of those processes. Thus,
excluding natural products and processes from patentable subject
matter seems a sensible interpretation of the statute (and it
remains the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute even
after Chakrabarty).
The exclusion of living matter from patentability therefore had
a firm theoretical basis as long as the rule was seen as deeply
connected to the more general principle forbidding patents on
natural products. That connection collapsed in the late twentieth
century. For example, Chakrabarty's process for making his
bacterium-which involved grafting cellular components called
plasmids from one bacterium into another8 1-seemed to involve a
greater degree of human intervention. He was doing more than just
selecting the best of nature's products. Denying Chakrabarty a
patent on his bacterium seemed to diverge from, and indeed to
contradict, the traditional principle that forbade patents on nature's
work, but allowed them on the works of human art.
Second, not only did Chakrabarty's invention seem more a
product of human intervention and less about natural processes, but
the type of human intervention involved was more amenable than
selective breeding to the Patent Act's basic requirement that any
patented invention must be disclosed through "written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art ... to make and use the same."82 Breeders
of new plants or animals could not explain through any written
description how to recreate those living things. True, other breeders
could go through a similar process of breeding, selecting, and
breeding again, but there would be no guarantee that natural
chance would produce anything similar to what the earlier breeders
had found. Rather, to enable someone else to create the living
organisms they developed, breeders would have to convey some
living sample or specimen, which could then be used to grow or to
available at http://www.archive.orgtstream/dictionaryofenglO1 johnuoft#page/nl82/mode/lup
(emphasis added).
81. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2006).
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create, through natural processes, new specimens.8 3 In other words,
the invention could not be created using information in a written
document; a copy of the invention itself was necessary. Forbidding
patents on such inventions seemed sensible given the written
disclosure requirements in the statute.
Once again, that traditional basis for the rule against pat-
enting living matter was eroding in the late twentieth century.
Chakrabarty, in contrast to breeders, could set forth information in
a written patent specification that would enable someone else to
recreate the invention working from starting materials other than
the invention itself.84 Chakrabarty's work looked to be more sci-
entific, and it was scientific in a way that linked up with a basic goal
of the patent system: his work created information that could be
disclosed and disseminated through a written document.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Chakrabarty's case high-
lighted a significant weakness of any per se rule against patenting
living matter: the rule was never thought to extend to prohibit the
patenting of novel combinations of living and nonliving material.85
That limitation meant that, while the PTO rejected Chakrabarty's
claim to his new bacterium, the agency was perfectly willing to
allow a claim to an inoculum composed of nothing more than the
bacterium plus "a carrier material floating on water, such as
straw."8 6 Of course, all rules can lead to situations when a case on
one side of the line looks only slightly different from the case on the
other. But even accepting that general weakness of rules, the
results reached by the PTO in evaluating Chakrabarty's patent
claims seemed a little absurd. Under the agency's view, Dr.
Chakrabarty's brilliantly constructed and engineered new bacte-
rium was outside the patent system, but if he threw in a bit of
83. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (finding Chakrabarty's discovery patentable under § 101
because he had "produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature").
84. Id. at 305 n. 1 (describing Chakrabarty's process).
85. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 251-52
(1890) (noting that, in defining the elements of an invention, "[t]he elements, the earth, the
animal creation, the members of the human body are as available as the machines and
chemical compositions which have resulted from inventive skill"); see also Ruloff F. Kip, Jr.,
The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371, 408 (1951) (citing this
passage from the Robinson treatise in support of the position that naturally occurring and
living things could be the "constituents of patentable subject matter").
86. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.
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inanimate straw (which was dead but used to be alive!), he then had
achieved a patentable invention. That result is hugely counter-
intuitive, and it was surely one of the biggest weaknesses in the
agency's case before the Supreme Court.
C. The Unpatentability of New Uses
The prohibition against patenting new uses of old machines is
one of the most historically interesting and practically important
rules of patentability. The rule is very old, was widely accepted in
the nineteenth century,87 was adopted by the Supreme Court, 8 and
was ultimately overruled by Congress in 1952.89 That last point is
perhaps the most significant, for the prohibition on patenting new
uses is a clear example in which the judicial gloss on patentable
subject matter has been legislatively rejected.
The prohibition against new uses can be traced back at least to
Thomas Jefferson. In his famous letter to Isaac McPherson,
Jefferson explained that, during his tenure on the early Patent
Board (which lasted only from 1790 to 1793), the Board developed
some "general rules," including "that a machine, of which we were
possessed, might be applied by every man to any use of which it is
susceptible, and that this right ought not to be taken from him,
and given to a monopolist, because he first perhaps had occasion
so to apply it."9 Jefferson's rule was endorsed by commentators
throughout the nineteenth century, who generally maintained that
a new use of an old machine, manufacture, or process was not
patentable.9 By 1875, the rule had received the blessing of the
Supreme Court, which unequivocally stated that "it is no new
invention to use an old machine for a new purpose."92
87. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://memory.loc.
gov/master/msslmtj/mtj 1/046/1000/1063.jpg. Many transcriptions of this letter contain errors
that alter the rationale given by Jefferson for the rule. See, e.g., 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905) (mistranscribing the final clause in this
passage as "because the first perhaps had occasion so to apply it" (emphasis added)).
91. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 19, § 3-4; PHILLIPS, supra note 17, at 102-03.
92. Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875). The Supreme Court had previously discussed
the doctrine forbidding patents on "double uses." In some of those cases, the Court articulated
the doctrine narrowly so that new use patents were only barred when the "structure and
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Yet this rule did not endure. Even in the middle of the nineteenth
century, sophisticated commentators such as George Curtis were
hedging their articulations of the rule. Curtis left open the possibil-
ity that the rule barring patents on new uses-which he (and
others) referred to as the "double use" doctrine-applied only when
the new use was "merely analogous to the former occasions or
purposes to which the same thing has been applied. 93 But Curtis's
concept of "analogous" was sufficiently broad that it still left many
new uses unpatentable. Thus, for example, Curtis expressly
considered the case when "it is discovered that a medicine, known
and used as a valuable remedy in one class of diseases, has also
great efficiency in curing another and different disease."94 To Curtis,
that case illustrated an example when the double use doctrine did
apply and a patent on the new use was not available.95
As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the "double use"
doctrine eroded as the exception to the rule-a new use might be
patentable if not analogous to prior uses-gained in importance.
Thus, in 1890, William Robinson's treatise criticized an 1843 circuit
opinion by Justice Story because Story had not recognized that new
uses were unpatentable only when the new use was "analogous to
former uses."'  That same year, the Supreme Court in Busell
Trimmer Co. v. Stevens opined that the use of gutta-percha as an
electrically insulating cover for metallic wires could be patented,
even though gutta-percha had previously been used as a covering for
metallic wires to prevent mechanical abrasion.97 The Court ex-
plained that the new use was not a
use for a purpose at all analogous to any before made of it; but
that it was an entirely new use, the result of a discovery that
gutta-percha was an electrical non-conductor, evolved by original
action" of the prior art "suggested to the mind of an ordinarily skilful mechanic this double
use to which it could be adapted without material change." Tucker v. Spalding, 80 U.S. 453,
455-56 (1872); see also Washing-Machine Co. v. Tool Co., 87 U.S. 342, 351 (1874) ("TIhe new
application, without any novel and useful result, could hardly be considered invention. It
would be but a case of double use."). However, these earlier mentions articulated a more
limited version of the rule.
93. CuRTIS, supra note 19, at 120.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. ROBINSON, supra note 85, at 360.
97. 137 U.S. 423, 434 (1980).
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thought, totally different from its quality previously known and
applied, as a mere mechanical protector from external injuries.9"
The Court's teaching in Busell Trimmer meant that Jefferson's
original rule against patenting new uses was largely dead, because
it allowed the patenting of a new use if it was "an entirely new use"
based on "original thought."99 With that limitation, the new use
doctrine, if not yet completely dead, was surely on life support with
little chance of recovery. Gradually the courts and commentators
began folding what was left of the doctrine into the branch of
patentability analysis that would eventually be known as obvious-
ness.100 When Congress recodified the patent laws in 1952 and
legislatively recognized the obviousness doctrine, it simultaneously
included language in the new § 100(b) to abolish whatever was left
of the old prohibition against patenting new uses.10 '
D. The Unpatentability of Methods of Medical Treatment
The rule against patenting medical methods is now largely
forgotten, but it had life for about three quarters of a century until
the Patent Office, which created it, destroyed it.
The rule's origins could be traced to a historically important
controversy concerning a famous patent issued to Dr. William G.
Morton, a Boston dentist who discovered that ether could be used
safely to anesthesize patients during surgery." 2 Prior to Morton's
work, pain during surgeries was such an enormous problem that
surgery was considered "a desperate measure," "as much dreaded by
the surgeon and by the patient," and was "employed only when the
alternative appeared to be the death of the patient."'0 3 Ether had,
however, long been known, and even ether's painkilling and sleep-
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Paul Cole, KSR and Standards of Inventive Step: A European View, 8 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 14, 20 (2008).
101. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1952) ('The term process means process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition or matter, or
material.").
102. See J.M. Fenster, How Nobody Invented Anesthesia, INVENTION & TECH., Summer
1996, at 24, 35.
103. Richard B. Berlin, History of Anesthesia, 64 SCI. MONTHLY 530, 530 (1947).
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inducing qualities "were commonly known, though considered only
for their entertainment value."' 4 Morton discovered the medical use
of ether to render patients insensible to the pain of their surgeries,
and for that invention he sought and obtained a patent.'
Morton's patent generated enormous controversy in part because
the American Medical Association (AMA) was generally opposed to
all medical patents which, in the AMA's view, not only were con-
nected with "base profiteering, medical monopolies, and quackery"
but also "impeded science and unfettered inquiry, and turned
matters of truth and knowledge into business concerns.""°6 Though
Morton's patent was eventually invalidated in the 1862 case
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary°7 (and Morton died poor six
years later),0 8 the Morton court did not announce a rule against
patenting medical methods but instead relied on the nineteenth-
century rule against new use patents. The court noted that, prior to
Morton, it had "long been known" that the inhalation of ether
"produced an effect like that of intoxication, exhilaration, and
more or less stupefaction."'0 9 Morton discovered a new use for ether
but, the court held, "the application of a well-known agent, by
well-known means, to a new or more perfect use" was not patent-
able. 110 Thus, Morton's patent was a casualty of the nineteenth-
century's rule against new use patents.
Two decades after the Morton case, the Patent Office announced
in Ex parte Brinkerhoff that "methods or modes of treatment of
physicians of certain diseases are not patentable.""' Although it
104. Fenster, supra note 102, at 28.
105. Morton's patent was U.S. Patent No. 4848 (1846). Though Morton was widely and
popularly credited with the invention of ether as a surgical anesthetic-his 1846
demonstration of ether as an anesthesia astounded the Boston medical community-his claim
to being first was hotly disputed throughout his lifetime. See Stephanie Browner, Ideologies
of the Anesthetic: Professionalism, Egalitarianism and the Ether Controversy, 51 AM. Q. 108,
109-11 (1999) (detailing the enormous controversy over the patent); Fenster, supra note 102,
at 35.
106. Browner, supra note 105, at 124.
107. 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 8865).
108. Browner, supra note 105, at 111.
109. Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 882.
110. Id. at 883.
111. Exparte Brinkerhoff, 24 Comm'r Manuscript Decision 349 (Pat. Comm'n 1883) (Case
No. 182), reprinted in 27 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 797, 798 (1945).
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cited and relied on the judicial Morton decision," 2 the Patent
Commissioner's decision was obviously much different, for it barred
patents on all methods of treatment even if they did not fall within
the traditional restriction of the new use doctrine. The Brinkerhoff
decision also used different reasoning, claiming that, since treat-
ment methods do not always produce the desired result, patents on
such methods "would have a tendency to deceive the public by
leading it to believe that the method therein described and claimed
would produce the desired result in all cases.""3 That reasoning,
like the reasoning that once barred patents on living things, was
ultimately grounded in the concern that the written description of
the invention would be somehow defective. Yet, as was also the case
with the living matter prohibition, the agency stated its rule as a
categorical limit on patentable subject matter.
Brinkerhoffs questionable logic was officially abandoned in the
1954 decision Exparte Scherer.114 As noted in Scherer, the "only spe-
cific reason given" in Brinkerhoff to sustain a rule against patenting
therapeutic methods was that the patented method might have
some "uncertainty of results.""' 5 But that "does not appear to be a
valid reason for categorically refusing all methods.""' 6 It is instead
"more properly considered under the question of utility,""' and
utility doctrine generally recognizes that an invention may be useful
even if it is successful only part of the time."8
The history of the rule against medical treatment patents did
not end with Scherer. In 1996, Congress granted "medical practi-
tioner[s]" a special immunity against all infringement suits arising
112. Id.
113. Id. at 798.
114. 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (expressly overruling
Brinkerhoff). Even before Scherer, the Patent Office had issued patents on medical
treatments. See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 651, 658-60 (1995) (listing forty-eight selected medical process
patents, five of which were issued prior to Scherer, and maintaining that such patents are "not
a recent phenomenon").
115. Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. at 110.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Freedman v. Overseas Scientific Corp., 248 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1957)
(holding that an invention "may have Patentable utility even though the Patented device is
not unfailingly operable in all its applications").
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out of any "medical activity.""' 9 Under the statute, patents covering
medical activity are still valid, but one class of potential defendants
is exempt from liability.20 Thus, the law has given up any exclusion
of treatment methods from patentability and has instead focused
more narrowly on curtailing the liability of particular defendants.
This example illustrates a point previously mentioned: there are
alternatives to rules restricting patentable subject matter, and
those alternatives may be better able to address any underlying
policy concerns. Here, the AMA had long been trying to protect its
members (doctors) from legal liability. The AMA concern seems
better addressed by a statutory immunity, which accomplishes the
organization's specific goal without completely foreclosing the
possibility that the granting of patents for medical treatment could
be socially worthwhile.
The four examples of failed rules detailed above-the rules
against patenting (i) changes in form and proportions, (ii) living
matter, (iii) new uses, and (iv) methods of medical treatment-are
only examples of failures, and they are only from the United States
doctrine. Other, lesser known failures exist even within United
States doctrine.' 2 ' Rules also do not seem to fare better in other
119. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).
120. See generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical
Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 789 (1996) (describing the history of the 1996
amendment bill and the AMA's role in supporting it).
121. For example, the Supreme Court once suggested in dicta that buildings and other
large structures could not be patented because they were not machines, compositions of
matter, or manufactures. See Jacobs v. Baker, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 295, 297 (1869). That rule of
unpatentability was occasionally applied in the lower courts. See Am. Disappearing Bed Co.
v. Arnaelsteen, 182 F. 324, 325 (9th Cir. 1910) (invalidating a patent on a design for an
apartment having a bed that "disappeared" into a recessed compartment). Still, the rule was
so nonsensical that, even though it was articulated in Supreme Court dicta, it was eventually
thoroughly rejected in the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Park-In Theaters, Inc. v. Rogers, 130
F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir. 1942) (rejecting a categorical prohibition on patents for buildings or
structures); In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (holding that a novel grandstand
was eligible for a design patent); Intl Mausoleum Co. v. Sievert, 213 F. 225, 228 (6th Cir.
1914) (rejecting the statement in Jacobs as dicta and sustaining the patentability of novel
burial crypts); Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699,702 (3d Cir. 1913) (holding that "the
term 'manufacture' in the patent law embraces buildings" and that "factors of size and
immobility" should not be considered in determining whether an invention falls under this
definition). The oddity of the doctrine was apparent. Indeed, in evaluating the eligibility of a
grandstand for a design patent, even the Commissioner of Patents remarked that, "[c] uriously
enough,' the invention would be clearly patentable "if the grandstand as made by appellant
were of a toy character, one that could be picked up and carried around, purchased in a store
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countries. For example, the 1973 European Patent Convention
attempted to codify a rule forbidding patents on "programs for
computers, '  and yet that rule has been so eroded that most
commentators and practitioners believe that computer programs
have become as patentable in Europe as they are in the United
States. 2' The failure of patent eligibility rules appears to be a
general phenomenon spanning time and geography.
III. THE MODEST SUCCESS OF PATENTABILITY STANDARDS
Patentability determinations are dominated by standards.
Generally speaking, an invention may be patented if new, useful,
and nonobvious.'24 The most rule-like of those three requirements-
the novelty requirement-nevertheless incorporates standards
requiring judgments to be based on multiple factors. 2' Indeed, the
and carried home, or delivered by the use of a delivery vehicle."' Hadden, 20 F.2d at 276
(quoting the decision of the Commissioner of Patents). Yet, as the court of appeals reasoned
in Hadden, there seems to be no good reason for "size and immobility" to decide patent
eligibility issues. Id. The modern PTO now devotes an entire art classification (class 52) to
"buildings." See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Class 52 Static Structures, http://www.
uspto.gov/go/classification/uspcO52/schedO52.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
122. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art.
52(2)(c), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. The exclusion of patents on "programs for
computers" remains in the version of the European Patent Convention that is currently in
force. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art.
52(2)(c), Oct. 5, 1973, as revised by Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.epo.orglpatents/law/legal-texts/epc.html.
123. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 191 (4th ed. 2007) (reviewing the case law and commentary on
European software patenting and concluding that "[b]y the early 1990's, the de facto practice
of the EPO in the software field was not radically different from that of the U.S. PTO").
124. Id. at 611.
125. A claimed invention is not novel if "each and every element as set forth in the claim
is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference." Verdegaal
Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While that articulation of
novelty might sound like a rule, the underlying concepts of "express[]" and "inherent[]"
description are based on standards that take into account some range of considerations. Thus,
an invention will be held to be inherently disclosed only "if it is the 'natural result flowing
from' the explicit disclosure of the prior art." Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d
1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)). That standard requires significant judgment about what constitutes a "natural
result." Also, both express and inherent anticipation require a sufficient disclosure so that "[a]
person of ordinary skill in the art could practice [the subject matter] without undue
experimentation." Id. at 1381. This standard depends on numerous factors to decide the level
of "ordinary" skill and the amount of experimentation considered "undue."
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seemingly hard-edged "priority" rules governing which of multiple
inventors should be deemed first to invent have been held to be
"based on equitable principles and public policy as applied to the
facts of each case."2 ' The requirements of utility and nonob-
viousness are governed by general standards requiring judgments
on a range of factors that admit of no precise lines.'27 Finally, the
amount of disclosure necessary to sustain a patent is similarly
regulated by "a standard of reasonableness, having due regard for
the nature of the invention and the state of the art."'128
This overarching structure of patentability determinations is to
be expected because inventions are, by definition, sui generis events
with which the legal system has no previous familiarity.'29 It would
be wholly surprising if standards did not also dominate in governing
what has historically been the most unruly of patentability areas,
patentable subject matter. In fact, most patentable subject matter
decisions are accounted for by two legal doctrines: (i) the prohibition
against natural principles and natural phenomena, and (ii) the
doctrine forbidding patents on abstract ideas. Both of these operate
much more like standards than rules, and their very malleability
has led to their longevity.
A. The Unpatentability of Natural Principles and Phenomena
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the most important
part- of patentable subject matter case law has been the doctrine
126. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (interpreting 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) (1982)).
127. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (eschewing "rigid and
mandatory formulas" in obviousness analysis); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35
(1966) (holding that an invention cannot be considered "useful" within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 101 unless the invention has a "substantial utility" with "specific benefit exist[ing]
in currently available form"); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining
"specific" utility to mean a use that is "not so vague as to be meaningless").
128. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Ansul v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448
F.2d 872, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1971)) (noting that an invention will be considered enabled if the
patent specification can "teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation," and the test of "undue experimentation ... is not a single, simple factual
determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations").
129. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1003 (noting that rules are less likely to be desirable
"when the applications of the legal provision are few in number or relevantly different from
one another").
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that a patent could not cover a natural principle. The doctrine might
superficially seem to be so clear as to be categorized as a "rule," but
any detailed examination of the case law shows that the doctrine
operates much more as a standard, with a wide range of uncertainty
and numerous considerations governing its application.
In England, the doctrine was applied in the influential case of
Neilson v. Harford.3 ° Even in this early case, the uncertainty
associated with the doctrine was evident. Neilson discovered that
the efficiency of furnaces was increased if the air fed into the
furnace to sustain combustion was hot air, as opposed to cold air."'
Neilson's patent covered any furnace having a receptacle for heating
the air placed between the apparatus blowing the air into the
furnace and the furnace itself. One objection to the patent was that
it covered a mere "principle" (neither the court nor the advocates
framed the objection as being that the patent covered a "natural
principle"), and the court seemed to assume that any "patent on a
principle" would be void.'32 Ultimately, however, the court decided
that Neilson's patent was "not merely claim[ing] a principle, but a
machine, embodying a principle."133
Baron Parke's opinion for the court does not give a full expla-
nation for the reasoning by which the court reached that conclusion.
The questioning of counsel, however, reveals that the arguments
focused on the degree of disclosure given in the patent. Thus, even
the party challenging the patent conceded that the rule against
patenting a principle
is theoretically true, but practically it is not true. Practically,
you can have a patent for a principle, that is, if you embody your
principle in any clear, definite, and distinct form, no other
130. (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Exch.).
131. As the United States Supreme Court would later recognize, Neilson's contribution
could be viewed as "the discovery that hot air would promote the ignition of fuel better than
cold." O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853).
132. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273 (opining that it was "very difficult" for the judges to
distinguish Nielson's patent specification from "a patent for a principle"); see also Neilson v.
Harford, 1 Webs. Pat. Cas. 295, 342 (1841) (setting out a report of the argument in which
Baron Alderson distinguishes "between a patent for a principle, and a patent which can be
supported").
133. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
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person shall be allowed to take that principle and embody it in
some other form merely copied from yours."M
The crucial difference between the lawyers for the plaintiff and the
defendant concerned the degree of specificity needed in the patent.
While the defendants maintained that a patentee must "put [the
principle] in some shape" and the protection of the patent required
that "the jury think that that [accused infringer's] shape is an
imitation of [the patentee's] shape,"'35 the plaintiffs successfully
contended that Neilson did not have to specify any particular form
of the air-heating receptacle because modes of heating air were
"perfectly well known and practised at the time."'36 The split
between the plaintiffs and the defendants turned on the sufficiency
of Neilson's specification, and thus the court introduced the
"question itself' in the case as "depend[ing] on the proper con-
struction to be put on the specification itself."'37
The Neilson doctrine against patenting a principle was imported
into U.S. law in the celebrated case of O'Reilly v. Morse,'38 which
also demonstrated that, in practice, the no-patents-on-principles
doctrine turned on the standard for sufficiency of the specification.
The Morse case restated the rule against patenting principles,
though it articulated the doctrine as a prohibition against patenting
a "discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical
science."'39 Yet in explaining the invalidity of the broadest claim in
Morse's patent, the Court specifically relied on the statutory re-
quirements for adequate disclosure in the specification and held
that "the specification filed" did not support the claim because
Morse was attempting to claim "outside of it."'4 °
George Ticknor Curtis, the leading American patent commentator
at the time, read the Morse case as teaching that patentability was
134. Neilson, 1 Webs. Pat. Cas. at 343 (argument of Sir F. Pollack for the accused
infringer).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 345.
137. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
138. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
139. Id. at 116.
140. Id. at 119-20. Earlier in its opinion, the Court also made clear that Morse's broadest
claim was invalid because it failed to meet the written description requirement of the Patent
Act. See id. at 113 (describing Morse as attempting to claim "a manner and process which he
has not described and indeed had not invented" (emphasis added)).
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closely "connected with the construction of particular [patent]
specifications.'' Under Morse, Curtis taught, patents could issue
for "the application of a newly discovered truth in physics," but the
claim must not be "divested" of "all conditions" so as to make the
claim "an abstraction.' 42
In reading Morse to turn both on the scope of the disclosure in the
patent specification and on the connection between that disclosure
and the scope of the patent claim, Curtis was explaining that the
apparently rule-like doctrine embraced in Morse actually operated
more like a standard. As Curtis summarized it, the relevant ques-
tion was: "How far can the characteristic principle of a discovery or
an invention be made to extend by letters-patent, when that
principle consists in a novel and useful application of some physical
law, property of matter, or natural force?"' Yet if the doctrine
against patenting principles boiled down to a matter of degree
("How far"), then the doctrine did not have the certitude of a rule.
Indeed, in concluding his discussion of the "principle" doctrine,
Curtis warned both that "[n]o particular form of words can be
suggested capable of general use as a formula," and that "formular-
ies are of very little use in this branch of the law."'
' 4
The doctrine against patenting principles was the subject of much
commentary and great uncertainty throughout the second half of
the nineteenth century.145 Near the end of the century, William
Robinson remarked on the apparent internal contradiction in the
judicially made doctrine on patentability: "No proposition has been
more frequently or positively stated by the courts than that a
principle is not a patentable invention, and yet with almost equal
positiveness and frequency they have declared that the subject-
matter covered by a patent is the principle of the invention."'46 A
simplistic rejoinder to this apparent internal contradiction is that
141. CURTIS, supra note 19, § 124, at 140.
142. Id. § 159, at 184-85 (emphasis added).
143. Id. § 124, at 140 (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 166, at 191-92.
145. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 85, § 134, at 190-92 & nn.1-3 (chronicling the
uncertainty in the nineteenth-century cases applying the doctrine forbidding patents on
principles); S.H.H., Patenting a Principle, 7 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 129, 129 (1868) (introducing the
subject with the observation that "[t]he opinions of professional men are far from being
settled, apparently, upon all the questions involved in patenting a principle").
146. ROBINSON, supra note 85, § 134, at 190-91 (citations omitted).
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the unpatentability of principles always referred to "natural phys-
ical force[s]," '147 while patents were supposed to cover the inventor's
principle or contribution, which was properly attributable to the
hand of mankind rather than to nature.148 Yet that distinction is not
especially helpful because inventors' contributions-their princi-
ples-function only because they are all grounded in nature's
principles.
Consider, for example, Alexander Graham Bell's patent, the
validity of which was sustained in The Telephone Cases.'49 Bell's
claim to telephone technology-his process for transporting speech
using undulating electrical current--covers a useful and workable
method of telephony only because it is a "natural" principle that a
continuous undulating current is capable of carrying the sound of a
human voice with sufficiently small distortions that human ears can
understand it.' 5° Alternatively, if Bell's invention is considered not
to be a "natural" principle merely because nature itself never trans-
ports speech using electrical current-that is, nature needs to be
artificially harnessed to accomplish that end-then the Supreme
Court's invalidation of Samuel Morse's broadest patent claim
seems unjustifiable. Morse claimed an apparatus capable of using
electric current to print characters at a distance,15' and certainly no
naturally occurring phenomenon such as electricity accomplishes
that goal without human intervention.
One conspicuous passage from The Telephone Cases provides the
best illustration of why the prohibition against patenting "principles
of nature" could not be viewed as a bright-line rule. The Court in
The Telephone Cases distinguished its earlier ruling in the Morse
case and held that Bell's patent could be sustained because Bell did
not make any claim covering "the use of a current of electricity in its
natural state as it comes from the battery."'52 The natural state of
current as it emerges from the battery? If the product of a human-
made battery is considered a "natural" principle, then it is pretty
147. Id. § 138, at 197.
148. Id. § 139, at 198.
149. 126 U.S. 1, 572-73.
150. See id. at 6-7, 40.
151. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 69 (1854).
152. Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 534.
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easy to see that the distinction between natural and artificial was
not the most clear or stable in the law.
Unlike the failed rules of patentable subject matter,153 the pro-
hibition against patenting principles of nature still survives, but it
survives only because it has incorporated a complex set of factors
into its analysis and has thereby heeded Curtis's warning that
"formularies are of very little use in this branch of the law."'5 4 In
short, the doctrine has survived precisely because it has been
applied more like a standard than a rule.
B. The Unpatentability of Abstract Ideas
The 1978 decision in Parker v. Flook was the first Supreme Court
opinion to state that the category of "abstract ideas" was un-
patentable subject matter.' Since then the Court has repeatedly
referred to the concept as well-established law.15 Yet despite its
apparently recent origins, the doctrine is in fact quite old,'57
although in the past it was often blended together with the prohibi-
tion against patenting mere principles and was grounded in other
statutory provisions. 158 History explains why the prohibition against
abstractions has been so long-lived: it has textual support in other
provisions of the Patent Act, and far from being a crisp rule, it has
operated more like one consideration that the courts weigh in
judging patentability. 159
These points are evident in two of the early Supreme Court cases
applying the doctrine. In the 1853 case of Le Roy v. Tatham, the
Court used the concept of abstraction in describing the type of
principle that was unpatentable, stating, "[a] principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
153. See supra Part II.A-B.
154. CURTIS, supra note 19, § 166, at 192.
155. 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
156. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
157. One of the earliest of all Supreme Court patent opinions, Evans v. Eaton, noted that
the trial judge in that case instructed the jury that "a mere abstract principle cannot be
appropriated by patent." 16 U.S. 454, 475 (1818).
158. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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cannot be patented."'60 In the 1864 case of Burr v. Duryee, the Court
identified statutory language to justify the patent law's hostility to
abstractions.16 ' The Court quoted the statutory requirement that
patent applicants disclose their inventions and '"particularly point
out the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his
own invention or discovery.""62 Based on that language, the Court
held that it found "no authority to grant a patent for a 'principle' or
a 'mode of operation,' or an idea, or any other abstraction.' 63
The Court's reasoning in Burr reveals the textual foundation in
the statute that is both the true basis for the prohibition against
patents on abstract and the secret to its longevity. Quite apart from
§ 101 of the Patent Act, an abstract idea could not be patented
because abstraction is the very antithesis of the precision required
by the disclosure provisions of the Patent Act. For example, under
§ 112 of the current statute and under similar provisions in all prior
patent acts since 1836, the inventor must be able both to write
"claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter" of the invention and to provide a "written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable" the practice
of the invention.'
64
It may seem to be a puzzle why the prohibition against ab-
straction has migrated into patentable subject matter doctrine, so
that it is now thought of as an interpretation of § 101 rather than
§ 112, its more obvious textual home. But a similar migration
occurred with the doctrines restricting the patentability of living
things. There too the true barrier to patentability was the breeder's
inability to satisfy the disclosure requirements, but the problem
160. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853).
161. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1864).
162. Id. (quoting then existing statutory requirements).
163. Id.
164. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Similar requirements have existed ever since the 1836 Patent
Act, which required both a "full, clear, and exact" specification and claims that "particularly
specify and point out" the invention. Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119
(repealed 1860). While earlier Patent Acts lacked a claiming requirement, they too demanded
precision, not abstraction, in the inventor's disclosure of the invention. See Patent Act of Feb.
21, 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (requiring a disclosure in "full, clear and
exact terms"); Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793)
(requiring the patent specification to be "so particular" and the models or drafts "so exact" as
to enable the practice of the invention).
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came to be thought of as a patentable subject matter issue. 6 5
Perhaps there is a fair explanation for these migrations. When the
very nature of the alleged invention makes it impossible to satisfy
the Patent Act's disclosure requirements, that problem might be
better expressed as a patentable subject matter issue than as a
failure of disclosure, for that characterization clearly indicates that
the barrier to obtaining a patent lies in the nature of the alleged
discovery, not simply in the words chosen by the applicant--or more
frequently, by the applicant's attorney-to describe and disclose it.
Expressing the doctrine against abstractions as a patentable
subject matter issue also produces a collateral benefit. Because the
doctrine against abstractions is a general standard without crisp
delineations, it is easy to combine with the other patentable subject
matter standards. Thus, the doctrine against abstractions may
assist in giving content to the doctrine against patenting principles,
which has an unavoidable vagueness.'66 The Court's decision in
Parker v. Flook provides a good example. There the applicant sought
a patent on a method for updating an alarm limit for chemical
processes, yet the application did "not purport to explain how to
select the appropriate margin of safety, the weighting factor, or
any of the other variables" and also lacked "any disclosure relating
to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process vari-
ables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm
system."16' The Court repeatedly referred both to the doctrine
forbidding the patenting of principles or scientific principles and to
the doctrine against abstractions.16 The ambiguity in whether the
Court was relying on one or the other is in fact a strength of the
opinion, and it is this type of reasoning that should be expected in
an area of law unavoidably dominated by standards.
In sum, the traditional doctrines of patentable subject matter-
the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas, natural phenom-
ena, and principles of nature-have survived because they have
textual bases in the statute and because they have been amorphous.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part III.A.
167. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
168. Id. at 589, 591-92, 599.
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IV. THE FATE OF THE RULE FROM THE BILSKI EN BANC
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in Bilski on November
9, 2009, and thereafter the Court will decide the fate of the rule
articulated by the Federal Circuit in its en banc decision. 169 Any
discussion of what the Court may do may seem like pointless
speculation at this time, but it is not so. This Article puts forward
a theory about patentable subject matter doctrine, and the true test
of any theory is whether it can render accurate predictions about
events in the real world. Thus, the predictions here will eventually
serve to validate or to falsify the theory.
The chief prediction of this Article is that the en banc rule will not
endure, but this does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court
will reverse the Federal Circuit. Rather, there seem to be three
likely outcomes of the case, none of which will produce an enduring
and crisp rule of patentability.
First, the Supreme Court could conceivably endorse the Federal
Circuit's machine-or-transformation rule. Yet even under this
outcome, the crucial issue will be whether that test will endure as
a rule. The answer already seems apparent in the way the PTO and
the lower courts have applied the machine-or-transformation test
over the last two years. During this time, the agency has repeatedly
held that processes executed on a computer sometimes do not
qualify as patentable under the machine-or-transformation test. The
reasoning is that, if "[a]ny and all computing systems will suffice,
[then] the claim is not directed to the function of any particular
machine.""17 Yet the agency has not been entirely consistent, and
169. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
170. Exparte Langemyr, Appeal 2008-1495, slip op. at 22 (B.P.A.I. May 28,2008), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd08l495.pdf. Similarly, another decision
reasoned that a computerized invention was outside of patentable subject matter because it
would "cover any and every possible digital computer for executing the [claimed] transformer
program." Exparte Snyder, Appeal 2008-4598, slip op. at 22 (B.P.A.I. May 12, 2009), available
at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdfsystem=BPAI&flNm--fd20084598 -05-12-2009-1; see
also Ex Parte Nawathe, Appeal 2007-3360, slip op. at 8 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 9, 2009), available at
httpJ/des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdfjsystem=BPAI&flNm= fd20073360-02-09-2009-1 (holding
a method to be unpatentable because it is tied to "a general purpose processor ... as opposed
to a particular computer specifically programmed for executing the steps of the claimed
method").
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has sometimes held that merely "includ[ing] a step of outputting
information from a computer" may be sufficient to make a patent
claim "tied to a particular machine or apparatus."''
Lower courts have also held invalid some process patents even
though they are tied to computers. For example, the court in
DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber embraced the theory that a "central pro-
cessor" of "a general purpose computer" does not always "constitute
a 'particular machine.""72 Nevertheless, that court hedged its
holding, noting that a general purpose computer did not qualify as
a particular machine "in this case" where the computer had "been
programmed in some unspecified manner."'73 Similarly, the court in
Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc. reasoned that a patent
claim limited to functioning on the Internet was not tied to a
particular machine because "the internet is an abstraction. If every
computer user in the world unplugged from the internet, the
internet would cease to exist, although every molecule of every
machine remained in place."'74
The logic from Cybersource may seem especially odd: a car
might no longer be called a "car" if it were disassembled into its
constituent parts, but that hardly seems sufficient to prove the car
to be an abstraction. But the more important lesson from these
administrative and judicial rulings is that the machine-or-transfor-
mation rule is already disintegrating as a fixed rule. Instead, the
decisions are showing inconsistency, as at the PTO; or the reasoning
is being limited to the particular facts of "this case," as the court
in Dealer Track did; or the machine-or-transformation test is
being blended with the doctrine forbidding abstractions, as the
Cybersource court seemed to be trying to do. If the reasoning of
these cases remains incomplete or faulty (and it seems very hard to
accept the claim by the Cybersource court that disassembly demon-
strates abstraction), the explanation is that the machine-or-
transformation test itself is not satisfactory and is already evolving
into something different that neither the courts nor the agency can
yet articulate.
171. See, e.g., Exparte Dickerson, Appeal 2009-001172, slip op. at 16 (B.P.A.I. July 9,2009),
availableat http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm--fd2 9 ll72-07-09-
2009-1.
172. No. CV 06-2335 AG (FMOx), 2009 WL 2020761, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2009).
173. Id.
174. 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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Thus, even if it survives Supreme Court review, the machine-or-
transformation rule will likely evolve. Perhaps it will follow the path
of the old rule against patenting mere changes in form or propor-
tions, which was ultimately transformed into the nonobviousness
doctrine. Or perhaps it will follow the path of the rule against
patenting new uses, which became so heavily qualified that it was
ultimately abandoned. But whatever the direction of its evolution,
the machine-or-transformation test is unlikely to remain a crisp,
clear rule of patentability.
A second possible outcome of the Bilski case is that the Court will
reject the machine-or-transformation test, but endorse another rule
of the Court's own formulation. Given the breadth of alternatives
argued by various amici in the Federal Circuit, the Court will have
a large variety of alternative possible rules from which to choose.
Yet the possibility of the Court embracing another rule does not
seem great. Any such alternative rule would share the greatest legal
vulnerability of the machine-or-transformation test-it would lack
any textual basis in the governing statute-and in addition, it would
lack the support of the agency that would have to administer the
rule. But even if the Court were willing to overlook such problems
and endorse a rule other than the machine-or-transformation test,
that rule would also seem to have little hope of long term survival.
Consider, for example, a rule against patenting any business
methods, which might well be the leading contender if the Supreme
Court were to adopt a rule other than the machine-or-transforma-
tion test. That rule has at least some tradition behind it. Yet that
very tradition demonstrates that any prohibition against business
methods would not long endure as a "rule."
Between 1949 and 1995, the Patent Office maintained in its
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) a tepid endorse-
ment of a "business method" exception. The 1949 edition of the
MPEP stated: 'Though seemingly within the category of an 'art' or
method, the law is settled that a method of doing business can be
rejected as not being with the statutory classes."'75 Two features of
that passage are striking. First, the agency conceded that methods
of doing business fell within the apparent literal scope of the
175. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (1st ed. 1949), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/old/mpepEIRO.htm (citing Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F.
467 (2d Cir. 1908)).
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statutory provisions governing patentable subject matter. Second,
the passage stated merely that a method of doing business "can
be"-not "must be"-rejected as being outside of patentable subject
matter. The case cited by the MPEP relied on the theory that "a
mere abstraction" is unpatentable and reasoned that "[a] system of
transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out
the system" was unpatentable.176
The traditional reasoning underlying the business method
exclusion suggests that the exclusion was never a bright-line rule
against patenting the processes and methods of business. It was
instead merely a specific articulation of the more general doctrine
against patenting abstractions. Indeed, prior to its elimination from
the agency's MPEP in 1995, the PTO was not enforcing the business
method exception as a bright-line rule. Patents like the one at issue
in State Street Bank & Trust-which was directed to a data pro-
cessing system for "Financial Services"-were being issued while
the agency was still enforcing its policy that some business methods
could be rejected as nonstatutory.' Thus, even if a business method
exception were revived by the Supreme Court, it would likely return
to its preexisting evolutionary course away from being a rule.
The third possible outcome at the Supreme Court is that the rule
from the en banc decision in Bilski will be rejected. That outcome
would not necessarily mean that the inventors in the Bilski case
would ultimately receive a patent. The claims in the patent would
still have to survive scrutiny under the traditional standards
associated with patentable subject matter doctrine. One judge at the
Federal Circuit suggested that the inventors' claims might have
trouble surviving scrutiny under the prohibition against abstract
ideas.'78 And even if the claims are patentable subject matter, they
will still need to be evaluated under the statutory standards for
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. If the Supreme Court rejects
the en banc rule in Bilski, the attempt to articulate a new rule of
176. Hotel Sec., 160 F. at 469 (emphasis added).
177. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting that the patent at issue was on a 'Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke
Financial Services Configuration"). That patent had been issued in 1993, years prior to the
agency's repeal of its business method exception rule. See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed
Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
178. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the court could have affirmed the rejection of Bilskis patent with "a single sentence:
'Because Bilski claims merely an abstract idea, this court affirms the Board's rejection"').
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patentable subject matter will in some sense be a failure, as have
been prior attempts to impose limiting rules in the area. Yet even
that failure is not without value.
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF RULES AND THE VALUE OF FAILURE
While the historical record shows that relatively clear rules
governing patentable subject matter pass away with time, these
failures do have value. First and foremost, these rules may provide
the necessary stability to allow patents to serve as property rights
generally. Even when they are not perfectly clear, rules can serve
this function by marking some approximate boundary so that
inventors well away from the boundary have more stability. For
example, the rule against patenting surgical methods provided some
certainty that innovators in medical equipment and pharma-
ceuticals could continue to receive patents despite more general
opposition by doctors and their professional association to any
patents in the medical field. The rule barring patents on surgical
methods was a temporary compromise that gave a degree of
certainty to each side of the debate over medical patents.
The rules of patentability can also promote stability if the rules
are generally successful in removing some troubled areas from the
patent system. The rules prohibiting new use patents and patents
covering mere changes in form and proportions might very well have
been somewhat successful in excluding subject matter that today
would be barred by the nonobviousness requirement. In a legal
system that lacks or is still developing such a requirement, such
rules may have been valuable as means for excluding socially
pernicious patents that, if they had been issued by the Patent Office
and enforced by the court, would have brought the entire patent
system into popular contempt.
The ultimate failure of rules might also promote the long term
improvement of the law of patents. Several historical examples
prove this point. For example, the rule against surgical method
patents ultimately led to a restriction on the infringement remedies
available against doctors and other medical professionals.'79 So too,
the rule against patenting mere changes in form and proportions
sparked the development of the nonobviousness requirement in this
179. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).
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country," ° and experiences with the rule against patenting new
uses also seems to have contributed to the development of the
nonobviousness requirement.181
While each of those last two rules was legislatively repealed or
expressly repudiated,'82 their existence during the nineteenth
century provides powerful evidence that a legal system lacking a
crucial doctrine (as nonobviousness is in patent law) may be forced
to develop ad hoc rules to serve the ends that eventually will be
filled by a more theoretically rigorous doctrine. Indeed, the tempo-
rary rules of patentable subject matter might properly be viewed as
experiments in adjusting and refining the patent system. The
doctrinal area is a hotbed of evolution; it is where subtle intuitions
about the patent system have an initial effect. Those intuitions are
encoded into approximate rules, but in the long run, more nuanced
and theoretically rigorous doctrine supplants the approximations.
The newly announced patentability rule from the Bilski en banc
decision, like its predecessors, should not be expected to be a per-
manent feature of the law. It is a way station from which the law
will eventually depart, sooner if the Supreme Court rejects the rule
in its upcoming decision, later and in a more evolutionary manner
if the rule survives Supreme Court review.
The Bilski rule may also provide a hint of the lesson that will
ultimately come from this latest attempt to cabin invention with
rules: by demanding ties to "particular machines" or "transforma-
tions of articles,"'8 3 the en banc Bilski court was requiring new
innovations in business, information processing, and organizational
technologies to be tied back to a physical realm in which, through
long experience, our language and institutions are better developed
for defining inventions. Under this view, the en banc court's curb on
patentable subject matter might not represent hostility to innova-
tions in such newly emerging technologic fields, and indeed the
Bilski court itself ringingly reaffirms the view that patentable
subject matter does not have a "categorical exclusion[ ]" for business
methods."& Rather, the en banc court's restriction might have been
grounded in the legitimate concern that the language of business
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. See supra notes 57, 110 and accompanying text.
183. Bilski, 545 at 956, 962.
184. Id. at 960.
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and information technologies has not yet developed sufficiently to
support property rights absent some connection to older and more
developed fields of engineering.
Such a concern would make sense given the general structure of
the Patent Act, which assumes that patented inventions can be
described in "full, clear, concise, and exact" language."s This con-
cern would also find historical support in prior doctrines that
temporarily imposed restrictive rules on patentable subject matter
while technological, linguistic, and legal conventions developed
sufficiently to manage property rights along new frontiers of
innovation. Nevertheless, the overarching lesson from the history of
patentable subject matter is very clear: no field of engineering or
applied science has long remained outside the boundaries of
patentable subject matter. As engineering and applied science
develops new fields that are not tied to physical articles, physical
machines, and physical sciences, the Bilski en banc court's rule can
be expected to follow the path toward obsolescence that no prior rule
of patentable subject matter has escaped.
185. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2006); see also id. 2 (requiring patents to "conclude with one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention").
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